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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
fendents involved. Only Justices Marshall and
Brennan ruled that capital punishment violated
the eighth amendment under all circumstances.
Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White find the
lack of uniformity with which the death penalty
is imposed objectionable. A mandatory death
penalty for certain offenses would eliminate the
arbitrary, capricious, and freakish aspects of the
death penalty as presently administered, along
with restoring the deterrent value Justice White
believes has been lost. While mandatory capital
punishment might satisfy Justices Douglas:
Stewart, or White that the death penalty would
no longer be imposed in a cruel and unusual man-
ner, the dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun,
Burger, and Powell indicate that they would con-
sider a mandatory death sentence cruel and un-
usual because the jury as the primary indicator
of society no longer retains its discretion to be
merciful. Thus, even a death penalty which is
imposed uniformly and without discretion or dis-
crimination, mig-ht he held unconstitutional by
the Court in future decisions. While Furman took
three defendants off death row, there is no clear
holding that others may not constitutionally be
sentenced to die.
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The "Fighting Words" Requirement:
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)
In Gooding v. Wilson1 the United States Supreme
Court, for the second time in less than a year,
struck down a public disorder law as unconstitu-
tional on its face.2 The Court held that a Georgia
abusive language statute, which had not been
construed by the state's co4... -- ,pply on!- t:.
"fighting words," 3 was on its face void for vague-
ness and overbreadth.4
The case stemmed from an August 18, 1966
anti-war demonstration before the headquarters
of the 12th Corps., United States Army. 5 The
defendant and others attempted to block the door
so that inductees could not enter. When police
requested them to vacate the entrance, the dem-
onstrators refused to do so. A scuffle ensued during
2The first time was in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611 (1971), a case involving a Cincinnati
ordinance which made it illegal for three or more per-
sons assembled on a sidewalk to annoy those passing
by. See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
3 The "fighting words" test was first clearly articu-
lated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), a case which upheld a New Hampshire op-
probrious language statute because the New Hamp-
shire courts had limited it to "fighting words," that is,
words which "by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id.
at 572.
4The Georgia statute provided in pertinent part:
"Any person who shall without provocation, use to or
of another, and in his presence... opprobrious words
.,r abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the
peace ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." GA.
CODE Am. §26-6303 (1953).
5 405 U.S. 518, 519 n.l.
which the defendant committed assault and battery
on two police officers and uttered the "opprobrious
and abusive words" cited in the indictment.6 The
defendant was convicted in state superior court
on two counts of using language which violated
C: -:gia statute.7 In affirming his conviction,
the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the de-
fendant's contention that, among other infirmities,
the law in question was void for vagueness and
overbreadth.s The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia granted the
defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus
declaring that the Georgia statute as construed
by the state's courts was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad on its face. 9
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
and agreed with the lower court's reasoning in
doing so.10 Writing for the majority,n Mr. Justice
6The defendant allegedly said to one policeman:
"White son of a bitch, I'll kill you." He allegedly said
to another: "You son of a bitch, if you ever put your
hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id. at
520 n.1.
7Id. at 518.
8 Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967).
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the language of
the statute conveyed "a definite meaning as to the
language forbidden measured by common understand-
ing and practice." Id. at 533, 156 S.E.2d at 448.
9 Wilson v. Gooding, 303 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ga.
1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970).
10 405 U.S. 518, 524.
1 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
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Brennan first stressed that a statute punishing
speech must be so drawn or construed as not to
impinge upon expression protected by the first
amendment. 12 Brennan then upheld the defendant's
right to raise the issues of vagueness and over-
breadth. He argued that overbroad laws dealing
with first amendment rights tend to deter cdn-
stitutionally protected conduct; therefore, claim-
ants should be permitted to attack such statutes
on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth regard-
less of whether or not their particular actions would
have been constitutionally prohibited under a
precisely drawn statute."3
Apparently the Court found the Georgia law
unacceptable as written because most of its dis-
cussion was directed toward determining whether
or not the law had been narrowed to constitutional
dimensions by authoritative interpretations of
the'Georgia courts.' 4 In pursuing this analysis, the
majority relied heavily on Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,15 a case challenging a New Hampshire
statute which made it illegal to annoyingly, deri-
sively, or offensively address another in a public
place.16 The United States Supreme Court had
upheld the statute because the Supreme Court of
1 405 U.S. 518, 520.
IsId. at 520-21. The Court, id. at 521, relied on Jus-
tice White's disquisition on this subject in Coates v.
City of Cin~innati, 402 U.S. 611,619-20 (1971) (dissent-
ing opinion):
"Although a statute may be neither vague, over-
broad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the con-
duct charged against a particular defendant, he is
permitted to raise its vagueness or unconstitutional
overbreadth as applied to others. And if the law is
found deficient in one of these respects, it may
not be applied to him either, until and unless a
satisfactory limiting construction is placed on the
statute. The statute, in effect, is stricken down on
its face. The result is deemed justified since the
otherwise continued existence of the statute in
unnarrowed form would tend to suppress constitu-
tionally protected rights."
14Nowhere in its decision did the majority discuss
the validity of the statute as written; however, in its
discussion of the constitutionality of the law as con-
strued by the Georgia courts, the majority deals with
the statute as though its terms, as written, were un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad. See 405 U.S.
518, 525-27. See also text accompanying note 19 ifria.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent chided the majority for
making such an assumption of invalidity. Id. at 529.
is 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16 The New Hampshire law stated:
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to any other person who is lawfully
in the street or other public place; nor call him by
any offensive or derisive name, nor make any
noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing
with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to
prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or
occupation.
N.H. Pu. L, ch. 378, §2 [1926].
New- Hampshire years earlier had limited the
law's application to "fighting words" or words
which "by their very utterence inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of thepeace." 7
Such words, the Supreme Court had concluded,
were beyond the pale of constitutional protection
and thus a statute limited to them was valid.
The appellants in Gooding maintained that the
Georgia courts had limited the Georgia law in the
same manner as the New Hampshire courts had
limited theirs, but the majority disagreed.'8 They
said that previous state appellate decisions had
not construed the statute as applying only to
"fighting words" so consequently the statute was
unconstitutional. 9
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
filed dissenting opinions. The thrust of the Chief
Justice's dissent was that the "narrow language"
of the Georgia statute had little potential for ap-
plication outside the realm of "fighting words"
and that the Georgia cases considered by the ma-
jority supported rather than undermined his posi-
tion." He felt that in view of this and what he
considered the majority's tacit admission that the
defendant's conduct was not protected by the
"315 U.S. at 572.
18 405 U.S. at 524.
9 At 405 U.S. 525, the Court dealt with three Georgia
cases which it claimed defined the words "abusive"
and "opprobious" in a manner inconsistent with the
"fighting words" standard. In Lyons v. State, 94 Ga.
App. 570, 95 S.E.2d 478 (1956), a conviction under the
statute was sustained where the defendant awakened
ten women scout leaders by shouting, "Boys, this is
where we are to spend the night.., get the G_ d_
bed rolls out.., let's see how close we can core to the
G_ d_. tents." Id. at 571, 95 S.E.2d at 579. In Fish
v. State, 124 Ga. 416, 52 S.E. 737 (1905), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that a jury question was presented
by the remark, "You swore a lie." Jackson v. State,
14 Ga. App. 19, 80 S.E. 20 (1913), held that a jury
question was presented by the words, "God damn you,
why don't you get out of the road."
Regarding the meaning of the phrase "tendency to
cause a breach of the peace," the Supreme Court cited
the aforementioned cases as well as Elmore v. State,
15 Ga. App. 461, 462, 83 S.E.2d 799 (1944), which
construed the term to mean words that would provoke
a violent reaction, although not necessarily an immedi-
ate one. The Court also cited Samuels v. State, 103
Ga. App. 66, 67, 118 S.E.2d 231, 232 (1961), which de-
fined the phrase in a manner encompassing all public
violations of the public peace and tranquility. 405 U.S.
at 525-27.
In response to the dissent's criticism of its citation
of fifty year old cases, the Court pointed out that both
Fish v. State, supra, and Jackson v. State, supra, were
cited in Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446
(1967), making them authoritative interpretations of
the statute in question by the state's highest court.
405 U.S. at 526 n.4.
2405 U.S. at 520.
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first amendment,21 that the majority had misap-
plied the overbreadth doctrine.2 He argued that
in prior decisions the Court had used the doctrine
with restraint, invalidating on their face only
those statutes whose potential for sweeping and
improper application was readily apparent.2 3 Jus-
tice Blackmun agreed with the Chief justice that
the statute was constitutional on its face and urged
that the majority's decision emasculated Chap-
linsky v. New Hampshire2 and left the states de-
fenseless in the face of obnoxious behavior.
2 5
The decision in Gooding is an example of the
Supreme Court's readiness to scrutinize carefully
public disorder statutes which affect first amend-
ment rights. Designed to deal with conduct which
disrupts the peace and order of society, disorder
laws traditionally have been loosely drawn, em-
ploying, broad, vague language and thus allowing
law enforcement officials a considerable degree of
latitude.26 Such laws present critical first amend-
ment questions because the rights of speech and
assembly often are impaired by their definition
and operation.
The Supreme Court's review of disorder laws
has involved two types of situations-those in
which time, manner and place of speech or assembly
21 Although the majority never admitted that the
defendant's conduct could have been prohibited under
a properly drawn statute, its lengthy discussion of the
right of a claimant in certain situations to raise the
charges of vagueness and overbreadth even when his
conduct is not constitutionally protected seems to sup-
port Chief Justice Burger's conclusion. See text ac-
companying note 13 supra.
2 405 U.S. at 530-33.
2 Id. Chief Justice Burger cited a portion of Justice
Black's opinion in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
52-53 (1971), to support his position.
24315 U.S. 568 (1942). Justice Blackmun claimed
that the decision in Gooding, when taken with Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), indicated that the
Court was paying only "lip service" to Chaplinsky.
405 U.S. at 537. Cohen held that the non-oral use of
offensive words ("Fuck the Draft") was not punishable
because the words as used did not fall into a category
that the government could prohibit. Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, supra at 20-22. Apparently Justice Blackmun
felt that in giving constitutional protection to the vulgar
language that was used in Cohen and in Gooding, the
majority rejected dicta in Chaplinsky which said that
certain words, including those that are lewd, obscene,
profane, libelous, and insulting, are not entitled to
constitutional protection. Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, supra at 572.
2 405 U.S. at 536.
26 See Meltzer & Trott, Disorderly Conduct, 4 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 311, 314-15 (1964);
Note, Public Disorder Statutes in Iowa: An Evaluation
of Existing Statutes and the Proposed Revision, 57 IA. L.
Rav. 862, 863-64 (1972); Comment, Wisconsin's Dis-
orderly Conduct Statute: Why It Should Be Changed,
1969 Wis. L. REv. 602, 606-08.
are regulated and those in which the content of
speech or the substance of conduct are restrained.Y
In the former cases, the Court has upheld the
validity of those statutes supported by a compelling
state interest and narrowly drawn to prohibit
activities detrimental to that particular interest s
When considering laws seeking to regulate the
content of speech in the interest of public peace,
the Supreme Court has required the states to
demonstrate a greater degree of justification than
in the cases of laws regulating time, place and
manner of speech and assembly. The emphasis
in this area has been on the reactions of listeners
to the speech in question. Speech which incites
others to violate the law may be punished, but
the reaction of the audience alone is not enough.29
A speaker may be constitutionally prosecuted
only if he had a specific intent to provoke im-
mediate lawbreaking and spoke in a situation
which would render such a consequence likely."0
The Court has relied a great deal on the void for
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines in dealing
with the conflict between disorder statutes and
first amendment rights. The void for vagueness
test asks whether a statute is on its face "so vague
that men of common intelligence must guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application." 3 ' Any
criminal or regulatory statute failing to meet this
minimum standard must fall for lack of fair notice
required by the due process provision of the four-
teenth amendment.n Under the overbreadth doc-
trine, any criminal statute capable of sweeping
27 The following discussion relies on the dichotomy
outlined in Note, supra note 26, at 874-77.
2 Thus the Court has invalidated flat statutory
bans on picketing, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), as well as laws forbidding the distribution of
handbills merely to keep the streets clean, Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), or to protect
privacy, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943), while it has upheld laws calling for prior licens-
ing of parades or the use of loudspeakers on the grounds
of public convenience and privacy. Fox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949). To protect the integrity of the judicial
process, the Court has sustained laws against picketing
courthouses. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
29 Bachellor v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963);
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
30 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
31 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926). An excellent discussion of the void for
vagueness doctrine can be found in Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960).
2 See Note, supra note 31, at 68 n.2 for the origins
of the doctrine.
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application into areas of constitutionally protected
activities must be held invalid3 3 While the two
concepts are generically distinct,. when laws cover-
ing first amendment activities are at issue, the
Supreme Court has used them in a manner which
leaves them virtually indistinguishable3
In dealing with allegedly vague or overbroad
public disorder statutes, the Court usually has
proceeded cautiously, considering the facts of the
particular case and then determining the consti-
tutionality of the law in question only as applied
to the specific fact situation.35 Coates v. City of
Cincinnati"' represented a departure from this
format and Gooding appears to further this de-
parture. In Coaes the Court considered a Cin-
cinnati ordinance that made it illegal for three or
more people assembled on a city sidewalk to
"annoy" those passing by. Without considering
the facts of the case and admitting that the ordi-
nance encompassed many types of conduct that
the city could constitutionally prohibit, the Court
concluded that the law was unconstitutional be-
cause it specified no precise standard of conduct,
33See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a compre-
hensive and insightful analysis of the overbreadth
doctrine see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadths
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970).
84 This is possible because both doctrines are respon-
sive to thi fact that precision and predictability of
government intervention are crucial to the protection
of first amendment rights and that vague or overbroad
statutes tend to deter the exercise of these rights.
Note, supra note 33, at 874.
Justice Brennan discussed the relationship of the
two doctrines in NAACP v. Button, 317 U.S. 415,
432-33 (1963):
The objectionable quality of vagueness and over-
breadth does not depend upon absence of fair
notice to a criminally accused or upon unchan-
nelled delegation of legislative powers but upon
the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amend-
ment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application.35See, e.g., Bachellor v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The Court's caution
sometimes resulted in confusion. In his concurring
opinion in Cox, supra at 577, Justice Black agreed with
what he believed to be the majority's conclusion that
the Louisiana breach of peace statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face. Nevertheless, in Brown the Court
reversed similar convictions under the same law not
because it was invalid on its face, but because the
record demonstrated that the petitioners had not
violated it. Brown v. Louisiana, supra at 141 (Fortas,
3., for the plurality).
36402 U.S. 611 (1971).
37Id. at 614. The Supreme Court concentrated on
the word "annoying" in pinpointing the- ordinance's
vagueness:
Conduct that annoys some people does not
and that it reached constitutionally protected
areas of free assembly and association."
The majority in Coates cited no precedents sup-
porting its decision to review the facial validity
of the Cincinnati ordinance irrespective of the
defendant's conduct, 9 but the majority in Gooding
was quite explicit in this respect.4" It relied on
a line of cases headed by Domb'rowski v. Pfister,41
which held that where the statute at issue purports
to regulate or prescribe rights of speech or press
protected by the first amendment, the defendant
is entitled to attack it on grounds of vagueness
and overbreadth even though it may be neither
vague nor overbroad nor otherwise invalid as
applied to his conduct.1
The Court's decision in Gooding, when taken
with Coates, seems to indicate that a majority
of the Justices have rejected the ad hoc approach
to cases involving public disorder statutes and
are ready to assess the facial constitutionality of
such laws regardless of the circumstances of the
particular case. Furthermore, in view of the fact
that the law invalidated in Gooding was at least
as narrowly drawn and construed as some of the
public disorder statutes that have survived judicial
scrutiny in the past,43 it would appear that the
annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in
the sense that it requires a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible nor-
mative standard, but rather in the sense that no
conduct is specified at all.Id.S* Id. at 615-16.
31 Justice White's dissent, however, provides a good
review of the case law supporting the majority's posi-
tion. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
619-20 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
40 405 U.S. at 521.
41380 U.S. 479 (1965).
42 Id. at 491-92. For other cases that use this line of
reasoning see United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Baggett v. Bullett, 370 U.S. 360 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
This approach is a marked departure from the tradi-
tional rule that "one to whom application of a statute
is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might be taken as
applying to other persons or situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) and the cases cited
therein.43 See, e.g., Bachellor v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564
(1970); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
In Edwards the Court did not strike down the state
common law crime of breach of the peace despite the
fact that the South Carolina courts defined it in vir-
tually the same language that the Court found unac-
ceptable in Gooding, 405 U.S. at 527. See text accom-
panying note 19 supra.
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Court has embarked in a new direction. The Su- strike them down unless they are precisely directed
preme Court seems ready to subject public dis- at specific harms which justify government in-
order laws to more exacting standards and to tervention in thefirst amendment area.
Of Whitman, Thoreau, and Constitutional Law:
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,' the
United States Supreme Court for the first time
considered the constitutionality of a vagrancy
law.2 In striking down the Jacksonville ordinance
as unconstitutionally vague, the Court delivered
a staggering blow to the "grabbag"' type of va-
grancy law and rendered questionable the status
of all vagrancy legislation.
This case involved eight defendants who were
convicted in a Florida municipal court of violating
a Jacksonville vagrancy ordinance.4 Four of the
1405 U.S. 156 (1972).
The Court had dealt with such laws on prior oc-
casions without reaching the issue of their constitu-
tionality. In Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953)
it considered a case involving a vagrancy statute, but
dismissed it as improperly before the Court. Justices
Black and Douglas dissented, arguing that the statute
was void for vagueness. Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). In Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252
(1966) the Court, in a per curiam decision, dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Douglas
again dissented. He condemned the vagrancy law in
question as an attempt to regulate the status of a
vagrant, something that he felt no law could do. Citing
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), which
held that imprisonment for merely being a narcotics
addict amounted to cruel and unusual punishment,
Douglas said that economic or social condition could
not be made a crime any more than being a drug addict
could. Hicks v. District of Columbia, supra at 257
(Douglas, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. Florida, 391
U.S. 596 (1968), the Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction for "wandering and strolling"
under a Florida vagrancy statute where the evidence
showed that the defendant was sitting on a bench at
the time of the arrest. The Court held that the convic-
tion violated due process because the record lacked
evidence to support the judgment. Id. at 598. In their
dissent, Justices White and Harlan contended that
the Court should have reached the defendant's claim
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at
599.
3 The characterization is that of Judge Will in refer-
ence to a Chicago disorderly conduct law in Landry v.
Daley, 280 F. Supp. 968, 969 (N.D. Ill. 1968). The
Chicago ordinance, like the Jacksonville vagrancy
ordinance and many other vagrancy laws, prohibited
many diverse types of behavior under a single heading.
See note 4 infra.
4The JACKSONVrLE FLA. ORDINANCE CODE §25-57
(1965) under which the defendants were tried and con-
victed provided that:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who
go about begging, common gamblers, persons
who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, com-
eight, two white females and two black males, were
arrested early on a Sunday morning and charged
under the ordinance with "prowling by auto." 5
The arresting officers denied that the racial mixture
in the car had played any part in the decision to
make the arrest, but claimed that they had acted
because the defendants had stopped near a used-
car lot that had been broken into several times
previously.6 Another defendant was convicted of
being a vagabond because he was loitering in down-
town Jacksonville on a weekday morning, had
no identification, and offered an explanation that
the arresting officers did not believe Two other
defendants were convicted as "common thieves"
in cases stemming from separate arrests8 The
mon drunkards, common night walkers, thieves,
pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property,
lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of
gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their
time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming
houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold
or served, nersons able to work but habitually
living upon tu . ,nings of their wives or minor
children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon con-
viction in the Municipal Court be punished as
provided for Class D offenses.
Class D offenses at the time of the defendants' arrests
and convictions entailed 90 days in jail, a $500 fine, or
both. 405 U.S. at 156 n.1.
5405 U.S. at 159.
6 There was no evidence that the used-car lot had
been broken into on the night in question. Id.
7 The defendant, a part-time produce worker and
part-time organizer for a Black political group, claimed
that he and a companion were waiting for a friend
who was to lend them an automobile so that they
could apply for a job at a produce company. Because
it was cold and he had no jacket, the defendant waited
for a while in a dry cleaning establishment, but left
when requested to do so. The store owners summoned
the police. Id.
8 Upon arriving at a girl friend's apartment, one of
the defendants had seen police there and attempted to
leave. He stopped and got out of his car when ordered
to do so. The police searched the car and the defend-
ant. Finding nothing incriminating, they charged him
with being a. "common thief" because he was reputed
to be one. The other defendant was arrested when he
reached his home early one morning. He was stopped
because he was traveling at a high rate of speed
[Vol. 63
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eighth defendant, whom the police claimed was
well known as a thief, narcotics pusher, and "gen-
erally opprobrious character," was arrested for
"disorderly loitering on the street" and "disorderly
conduct-resisting arrest with violence" when he
struggled with a police officer who was searching
him preparatory to placing him in a police car.9
The convictions were affirmed by the Florida
Circuit Court in a consolidated appeal and the
defendants' petition for certiorari was denied by
the District Court of Appeals.'0 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari."
The Supreme Court found the Jacksonville
vagrancy ordinance unconstitutional. Writing for
a unanimous Court," Justice Douglas held the
law unconstitutionally vague because it failed to
give adequate notice as to the conduct forbidden
and because it encouraged arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions 1 Under its vague termi-
nology, normally innocent behavior could be cause
for conviction: insomniacs could be arrested as
"common night walkers," recession victims as
"persons able to work but habitually living on the
earnings of their wives or minor children," the
country club set as persons "neglecting all lawful
business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting... places where alcoholic beverages
are sold or served." 14
A second aspect of the ordinance's vagueness
that concerned Douglas was the unfettered dis-
cretion which it gave the Jacksonville police-a
discretion which permitted and even encouraged
arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement.' 5
He pointed out that because many vagrancy laws
'(and Florida's in particular) were justified as
attempts to deter future criminal activity,16 they
allowed arrests based only upon suspicion and
yet no speeding charge was ever placed against him.
Id. at 160.
9 According to his testimony, the police officer in-
tended to arrest the defendant unless he had a good
explanation for being on the street. Id.
10 Brown v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141
(Fla. 1970).4 43 U.S. 917 (1971).
12 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist
took no part in the consideration or decision of the
-case.
"3 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
ItId. at 163-64.
Is Id. at 168.
16 In Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 596 (1968), the Su-
preme Court of Florida upheld the Florida vagrancy
statute as necessary to "deter vagabondage and pre-
vent crimes." 202 So. 2d at 855. See also Smith v.
State, 239 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. 1970) for a similar
view.
not upon probable cause as required by the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. 7 While acknowledg-
ing that such laws gave the police an effective
way to round-up "so-called undesirables," and
that sometimes those arrested actually anticipated
committing future criminal acts, Douglas con-
tended that the connection between vagrancy and
future criminality was too tenuous for a rule of
law.18
In discussing the potential for abuse of the law
in this case and the imprecision of such terms as
"wandering," "strolling," and "loafers," Douglas
asserted that the ordinance impinged upon some
of the amenities of life. 9 Although he admitted
that these amenities were not mentioned in either
the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, Douglas
believed that they deserved the Court's protec-
tion.20
Significant for what it says, Douglas' opinion
is almost as interesting for what it does not say.
It does not say that vagrancy laws are unconsti-
tutional because they punish a status. The de-
cision does not mention the word status and one
must look in vain for any reference to Robinson v.
California.2' In view of his dissent in Hicks v. Dis-
17The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and stipulates that no search or
arrest warrants shall be issued except "upon probable
cause." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. The Supreme Court
has long held that an arrest without a warrant is valid
only if based upon probable cause. See Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The Supreme Court has ap-
plied this standard to the states through the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
Is405 U.S. 156, 171. Douglas' contention appears to
be supported by empirical data. See McClure, Vagrants,
Criminals and the Constitution, 40 DENVER L. CENTER
J. 314 (1963).
19 Douglas argued that these amenities were em-
bedded in the writing of Whitman, Thoreau, and Va-
chel Lindsay:
These unwritten amenities have been in part re-
sponsible for giving our people the feeling of in-
dependence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These amenities have dignified the
right of dissent and have honored the right to be
nonconformists and the right to defy submissive-
ness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits
rather than hushed suffocating silence.
405 U.S. 156, 164.
20 This view is similar to that expressed by Douglas
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86(1965), a case which struck down a Connecticut law
prohibiting dissemination of information about birth
control methods. Douglas held that the law violated
the defendant's privacy and, although he could find
no mention of privacy in the Constitution, Douglas
contended that certain zones of privacy were pro-
tected by penumbras emanating from several of the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 482-86.
"370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson held that impris-
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trict of Columbia,22 where he attacked a vagrancy
law as an unconstitutional attempt to regulate
status, Douglas' silence on this issue perhaps can
best be explained by the fact that the ordinance's
vagueness was its most readily apparent consti-
tutional defect.
3
The Court's decision in Papachristou strikes
at an ancient institution. Vagrancy laws have
existed since the time of Edward HI and the first
Statute of Laborers." Originally formulated to
guarantee a cheap supply of labor when England's
labor force was dispersed and decimated by the
decay of feudalism and the Black Plague, the
early vagrancy laws made it illegal to be unem-
ployed or to migrate from one county to another
to avoid work or to seek better wages.2. With the
sixteenth century and the enclosure movement,
which forced many Britons off their fields and on
to the highways, 26 the vagrancy laws underwent
a shift in emphasis.27 Now the laws were directed
not only at controlling the labor supply, but also
- thwarting probable criminals and in time their
character became decidedly more criminal than
economic.28
In America virtually all jurisdictions enacted
vagrancy laws early in their history and many
have retained them, often little changed, to this
day.29 Some make a passive status such as un-
employment or poverty"0 criminal while others
onment merely for being a narcotics addict amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Douglas
cited the case in his dissent in Hicks v. District of
Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966), to condemn a
vagrancy law as an unconstitutional attempt to regu-
late status.
"383 U.S. 252 (1966). See note 21 supra.
2For discussions of vagrancy as a status crime, see
Murtagh, Status Offenses and Due Process of Law, 36
FoRD. L. REv. 51 (1967); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues
and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48
CALiF. L. REv. 557 (1960); Lacey, Vagrancy and,, %
Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HA.v. L. REv. 1203
(1953); and Note, Vagrancy--A Study in Constitu-
tional Obsolescence, 22 FLA. L. REv. 384 (1970).
" 23 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1349). Note, supra note 23, at
387-92 provides a good, concise history of vagrancy
1,-':!ation in England.
2523 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1349); 25 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1350).
26 Enclosure was the process whereby the scattered
holdings which characterized the medieval manors
were consolidated into larger units, often at the ex-
pense of tenant farmers. See W. NOTEsTErN, THE
ENGUSH PEOPLE ON THE EVE or COLONIZATION 72-73
(1954), for a graphic description of the process.
N ote, supra note 23, at 389.
8Id.
2Id. at 394.
"0See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §2666 (1942); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §563.340 (1943); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§565 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-4701 (1956);
WASH. PEv. CODE §9.87.010 (1965).
ban activities usually considered innocuous, such
as loitering or wandering about.3' There are those
that punish lewdness," drunkenness," or other acts
deemed odious by society, 4 and those that include
what are often viewed as separate crimes in other
jurisdictions.3" Many vagrancy laws are similar
to the Jacksonville ordinance in that they list
a myriad of classifications of vagrancy.36
Whatever their structure, vagrancy laws tradi-
tionally have stood almost impregnable before
the assaults of litigants and commentators alike.7
The first real break-through occurred with the
case of Fenster v. Leary.3" Fenster hau oeen arrested
three times in three months under a New York
State vagrancy statute and had been charged with
being "a person who, not having visible means to
maintain himself, lives without employment." 9
Each time he was acquitted. Apparently con-
cerned about the likelihood of future arrests,
Fenster sought a prohibit ion against further prose-
cutions under the statute on the grounds that it
was unconstitutional. Prohibition was denied in
the lower courts, but the court of appeals reversed,
holding that the statute unconstitutionally made
criminal an individual's conduct which in no way
impinged on the rights and interests of others and
which had little more than a "tenuous" connection
with crime and the preservation of order.40
Since Fenster, many federal and a few state
court decisions have declared state and local va-
grancy laws either partially or wholly unconstitu-
tional. While it is difficult to generalize about
these decisions, they have several features worth
"1See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §2666 (1942); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §563,340 (1943); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§565 (1962); Xasox. Rrv. CODE §9.87.010 (1965).
" See, e.g., WasH. REv. CODE §9.87.010 (1965).
"See, e.g., Oxa.r. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1141 (1956);
WASH. REV. CODE §9.87.010 (1965).
-4 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1141 (1956)
(family abandonment); WASH. REv. CODE §9.87.010
(1965) (using drugs).
36 Miss. CODE ANN. §2666 (1942) (selling alcohol
without a license); OxLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1141
(1956) (fortune telling).
36 Miss. CODE ANN. §2666 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§563.340 (1943); O:z.-. SIAT. ANx. tit. 21, §1141(1956); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §565 (1962); WASH.
Rzv. CODE §9.87.010 (1965).
" For attacks on vagrancy laws, see Foote, rc-
grancy-type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 603 (1956); Note, Constitutional Attacks on
Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782 (1963). See also
those articles listed at note 23 supra.
"20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E. 2d 426, 282 N.Y.S. 2d
739 (1967).
11 Id. at 311, 229 N.E. 2d at 427, 282 N.Y.S. 2d at
741.
40 Id. at 312-13, 229 N.E. 2d at 428, 282 N.Y.S. 2d
at 742.
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noting. The majority of those laws invalidated
were found unconstitutionally vague4 although
some fell for violating due process, 2 overbreadth,4
exceeding the state's police power4 and other
constitutional infirmities.45 Only a few, notably
Baker v. Bindner" and Alagata v. Commonwealthr
followed the logic of Fenster and Douglas' dissent
in Hicks v. District of Columbia." The most common
type of vagrancy legislation that encountered
constitutional difficulties was that which made it
a crime to be without visible means of support.
41
Loitering laws also fared poorly. 0 Yet despite
" See, e.g., United States v. Kilgren, 431 F.2d 627
(5th Cir. 1970); Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1970), affd, 437 F.2d 500 (5th
Cir. 1971); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897
(D. Col. 1969); Kirkwood v. Ellington, 298 F. Supp.
461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F.
Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Ricks v. District of Co-
lumbia, 414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Smith v.
Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556 (N.D.N.C. 1968); Baker v.
Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Arnold
v. City and County of Denver, 171 Colo. 1, 464 P.2d
515 (1970); Knowlton v. State, 257 A.2d 409 (Me.
1969); Alagata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287,
231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
"2See, e.g., Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897(D. Colo. 1969); Knowlton v. State, 257 A.2d 409
(Me. 1969); Alagata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass.
287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
"See, e.g., Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F. Supp.833 (.D. La. 1970), affid 437 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1971);
Gordon v. Schiro, 310 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. La. 1970);
Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613 (C.D. Utah 1969);
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
I See, e.g., Gordon v. Schiro, 310 F. Supp. 884
(E.D. La. 1970); Goodman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp.
897 (D. Colo. 1969).
"5 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (discriminates against those without
property); State v. Grahovic, 52 Hawaii 527, 480
P.2d 148 (1971) (violates fifth amendment).
46 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
47353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967).
48 383 U.S. 252, 257 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See note 2 supra. See also Wheeler v. Goodman, 306
F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
"See, e.g., Gordon v. Schiro, 310 F. Supp. 884(E.D. La. 1970); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp.
897 (D. Colo. 1969); Boughton v. Brewer, 298 F.
Supp. 260 (S.D. Ala. 1969); Kirkwood v. Ellington,
298 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969); Wheeler v.
Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Baker
v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Knowl-
ton v. State, 257 A.2d 409 (Me. 1969); Alagata v.
Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 231 N.E.2d 201
(1967).
&°See, e.g., Gordon v. Schiro, 310 F. Supp. 884(E.D. La. 1970); Scott v. District Attorney, 309 F.
these attacks, yagrancy laws remained on the
books in most American jurisdictions l resulting
in confusion and tension between the federal and
state courts.52
The Supreme Court's decision in Papachristou
should clarify the situation in those jurisdictions
where vagrancy laws are couched in vague and
archaic language similar to that used in the Jack-
sonville ordinance. In view of the Court's una-
nimity and the temper of its decision in Papa-
christou, it would appear that in the future it will
be quick to condemn vagrancy laws which are
loosely cast. Those charged with writing the rules
of society might well take heed and eliminate the
vagrancy concept entirely, imposing sanctions only
when there is clear and definite proof of the com-
mission of specific criminal acts.
Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1970), a fd, 437 F.2d 500 (5th
Cir. 1971); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (ID.
Colo. 1969); Boughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260(S.D. Ala. 1969); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp.
58 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp.
613 (C.D. Utah i969); Ricks v. District of Columbia,
414 F.2d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Smith v. Hill, 285 F.
Supp. 556 (N.D.N.C. 1968); Arnold v. City and
County of Denver, 171 Colo. 1, 464 P.2d 515 (1970).
51 For a list of state vagrancy statutes see Note,
supra note 23, at 394 n. 98.
5The situation in Florida epitomized this tension
and confusion. In 1967 in Johnson v. State, 202 So.
2d 852 (Fla. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S.
596 (1968), the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
state's vagrancy statute as constitutional on its face.
Two years later when the same statute came before
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida in Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F.
Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969), the court declared it void
for vagueness and overbreadth. Nevertheless in Brown
v. City of Jacksonville, 236 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1970),
rev'd sub nom. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
405 U.S. 156 (1972), when the defendants relied on Laza-
rus on the permise that the Florida vagrancy statute
was in all material respects identical to the Jackson-
ville ordinance under which they were convicted, the
Florida Circuit Court rejected their contention saying
that a "decision of a Federal District Court, while
persuasive if well reasoned, is not by any means bind-
ing on the courts of a state." Brown v. City of Jacks-
onville, supra at 142. The merry-go-round continued.
A month later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Kilgren, 431
F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1970), cited Lazarus in invalidating
a West Palm Beach ordinance which duplicated the
language of the Florida and Jacksonville laws. Two
months later, in Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 250 (Fla.
1970), vacated and remanded, 405 U.S. 172 (1972), the
Florida supreme court again upheld the constitu-
tionality of the state's vagrancy statute.
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